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Abstract  We  examine  RPTs  in  one  Continental  European  country,  Spain,  where  ownership
concentration  is  prevalent  and  state  ownership  is  practically  non-existent.  Our  results  show  that
more than  half  of  listed  Spanish  ﬁrms  commit  to  RPTs  over  the  analyzed  period.  Furthermore,
from the  perspective  of  the  related  party  to  the  transaction,  connected  transactions  between
listed Spanish  ﬁrms  and  their  blockholders  account  for  99.84%  of  the  total  RPTs  carried  out  by
listed Spanish  ﬁrms.  Finally,  our  ﬁndings  reveal  that  ﬁnancial,  operating  and  investment  dimen-
sions of  RPTs  negatively  affect  ﬁrm  value  due  to  the  presence  of  an  expropriation  effect  whereby
RPTs are  driven  by  insiders’  opportunism,  regardless  of  the  dimension  (ﬁnancial,  operating  and
investment)  affected  by  the  existence  of  RPTs.  Thus,  in  a  context  where  the  main  concern
of corporate  governance  is  the  potential  expropriation  of  minority  shareholders  by  controlling
owners,  RPTs  require  special  regulator’s  attention  in  order  to  improve  investor  protection  and
market conﬁdence  to  promote  a  more  efﬁcient  allocation  of  resources.
© 2016  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Among  the  accounting  scandals  of  ﬁrms  such  as  Enron,
WorldCom,  Adelphia  and  Tyco  in  the  US  that  shook  the  ﬁnan-
cial  markets,  related-party  transactions  (RPTs)  proved  to
be  a  major  problem.  These  transactions  were  supposedly
conducted  at  arm’s  length,  but  in  practice,  they  beneﬁt
the  principals  involved  (e.g.,  managers,  large  shareholdersPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Bona-Sánchez,  C.,  et  al.,  Rel
BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2016,  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2016.
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E-mail address: jeronimo.perez@ulpgc.es (J. Pérez-Alemán).
ﬁ
t
o
a
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2016.07.002
2340-9436/© 2016 ACEDE. Published by Elsevier Espan˜a, S.L.U. This is
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).r  their  relatives).  These  scandals,  jointly  with  European
rauds  such  as  Vivendi  and  Parmalat,  have  led  to  increased
nterest  in  the  study  of  RPTs  and  their  effect  on  capital
arkets.  Nevertheless,  little  rigorous  academic  research
as  investigated  the  market  effects  of  RPTs  (Gordon  et  al.,
004).  Furthermore,  despite  the  ﬁndings  of  previous  litera-
ure,  it  is  still  difﬁcult  for  investors  to  separate  legitimate
PTs  from  inappropriate  ones  (Duprey,  2006).
In  this  paper,  we  shed  light  on  the  RPTs  in  one  Continental
uropean  country,  Spain.  In  particular,  we  examine  the  con-ated-party  transactions,  dominant  owners  and  ﬁrm  value.
07.002
guration  of  RPTs  as  well  as  the  incidence  of  these  connected
ransactions  on  ﬁrm  value  in  a  sample  of  listed  Spanish  ﬁrms
ver  the  period  2004--2012.  The  Spanish  context  provides
n  interesting  setting  to  explore  this  question  for  several
 an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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easons.  First,  Law  26/2003  was  passed  to  increase  the
ransparency  of  listed  ﬁrms’  disclosures.  In  later  modiﬁ-
ations  included  in  Ministerial  Order  ECO/3722/2003  and
ircular  1/2004  of  the  Spanish  Security  Exchange  Commis-
ion  (Comisión  Nacional  del  Mercado  de  Valores),  Law
6/2003  expanded  the  disclosure  requirements  of  listed
panish  ﬁrms,  making  it  mandatory  for  Spanish  companies
o  disclose  related-party  transactions  in  their  annual  cor-
orate  governance  reports.  Moreover,  Spanish  ﬁrms  operate
n  an  environment  where  the  legal  system  provides  weak
rotection  of  minority  shareholders’  rights  (e.g.,  Djankov
t  al.,  2008;  La  Porta  et  al.,  1998).  Thus,  according  to  the
lobal  Competitiveness  index  2015--2016,  Spain  ranks  94th
mong  140  economies1 in  protection  of  minority  sharehol-
ers’  interests.  Thus,  according  to  previous  report,  Spain
btains  notably  worse  scores  in  terms  of  corruption  (Spain
anks  80th  out  of  140)  and  government  efﬁciency  (Spain
anks  94th  out  of  140).  Ownership  structures  of  Spanish
isted  ﬁrms  are  characterized  by  the  widespread  presence
f  dominant  shareholders  with  the  ability  and  incentives  to
onitor  the  managers  (Bebchuk,  1999;  Burkart  et  al.,  2003;
rossman  and  Hart,  1988;  La  Porta  et  al.,  2000,  1999,  1998).
n  this  context,  the  agency  conﬂict  between  shareholders
nd  managers  is  lower  while  the  main  concern  of  corporate
overnance  is  to  safeguard  against  the  self-serving  behav-
or  of  the  dominant  shareholder  and  thereby  prevent  the
xpropriation  of  minority  shareholders  (Burkart  et  al.,  2003;
a  Porta  et  al.,  2000;  Villalonga  and  Amit,  2006).  Thus,  the
panish  context  provides  an  interesting  setting  to  explore
he  conﬁguration  and  consequences  in  the  capital  markets
f  dominant  shareholders’  commitment  to  RPTs.
The  limited  empirical  evidence  on  RPTs  usually  suggests
wo  alternative  explanations  for  the  existence  of  RPTs.
irst,  according  to  the  transaction  costs  theory  (Coase,
937;  Pennings  and  Williamson,  1979),  RPTs  might  be  efﬁ-
ient  because  they  contribute  to  reducing  such  costs  and
vercome  the  difﬁculties  in  enforcing  property  rights  and
ontracts  that  are  essential  for  the  company  (Chang  and
ong,  2000;  Jian  and  Wong,  2010;  Khanna  and  Palepu,  2000;
tein,  1997).  From  this  perspective,  RPTs  beneﬁt  sharehol-
ers  and  may  have  a  positive  effect  on  ﬁrm  value.  The
lternative  view  is  based  on  agency  theory  (Berle  and  Means,
932;  Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976)  and  considers  RPTs  as  an
pportunistic  device  (Aharony  et  al.,  2010;  Cheung  et  al.,
006;  Gordon  et  al.,  2004;  Jiang  et  al.,  2010;  Morck  et  al.,
005).  Thus,  RPTs  could  be  used  by  insiders  as  a  mechanism
o  tunnel  resources  outside  the  ﬁrm.  Hence,  in  line  with  this
erspective  RPTs  might  negatively  affect  ﬁrm  value.
However,  these  studies  are  primarily  based  on  the  anal-
sis  of  simple  transactions  (Berkman  et  al.,  2009;  Cheung
t  al.,  2009;  Friedman  et  al.,  2003;  Ge  et  al.,  2010;  Jiang
t  al.,  2010)  and  are  mainly  focused  on  East  Asia  and  partic-Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Bona-Sánchez,  C.,  et  al.,  Re
BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2016,  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2016.
larly  on  the  Chinese  context  (Berkman  et  al.,  2009;  Chen
t  al.,  2009;  Cheung  et  al.,  2009,  2006;  Gao  and  Kling,  2008;
e  et  al.,  2010;  Jian  and  Wong,  2010;  Jiang  et  al.,  2010;  Lou
1 The Global Competitiveness Report 2015--2016 assesses the com-
etitiveness landscape of 140 economies, including the United
tates, Germany, The United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Spain, and
rovides insights into the drivers of their productivity and prosper-
ty.
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t  al.,  2014;  Peng  et  al.,  2011;  Ying  and  Wang,  2013),  where
tate  ownership  is  prevalent  and  ﬁrms  operate  in  a  state-
ontrolled  economy.  In  this  setting,  insiders’  and  auditors’
itigation  risk  is  low  and  companies  face  lower  public  and
edia  scrutiny.  Moreover,  previous  empirical  evidence  usu-
lly  includes  far-off  samples  (Berkman  et  al.,  2009;  Bertrand
t  al.,  2002;  Ge  et  al.,  2010;  Jian  and  Wong,  2010;  Jiang
t  al.,  2010;  Kohlbeck  and  Mayhew,  2010;  Lei  and  Song,  2011;
ekhili  and  Cherif,  2011;  Peng  et  al.,  2011).  According  to
revious  considerations,  the  results  from  these  studies  are
ard  to  generalize  to  Continental  European  ﬁrms  and  are
ifﬁcult  to  extrapolate  to  the  current  period  due  to  recent
egulatory  changes  that  have  taken  place  in  the  context  of
PTs.
Regarding  the  conﬁguration  of  RPTs  in  the  Spanish  stock
arket,  our  results  show  that  more  than  half  of  listed
panish  ﬁrms  commit  to  RPTs  over  the  analyzed  period.  Fur-
hermore,  from  the  perspective  of  the  related  party  to  the
ransaction,  connected  transactions  between  listed  Spanish
rms  and  their  blockholders  account  for  99.84%  of  the  total
PTs  carried  out  by  listed  Spanish  ﬁrms.  Finally,  our  ﬁndings
eveal  that  ﬁnancial,  operating  and  investment  dimensions
f  RPTs  negatively  affect  ﬁrm  value  due  to  the  presence  of
n  expropriation  effect  whereby  RPTs  are  driven  by  insiders’
pportunism,  regardless  of  the  dimension  (ﬁnancial,  operat-
ng  and  investment)  affected  by  the  existence  of  RPTs.
We  contribute  to  the  literature  on  the  effect  that  RPTs
ave  on  ﬁrm  value  in  three  ways.  First,  we  provide  novel  evi-
ence  on  the  conﬁguration  and  consequences  of  RPTs  in  the
apital  markets  for  a  context  in  which  protection  of  minor-
ty  shareholders’  rights  is  weak,  ownership  concentration  is
revalent  and  state  ownership  is  practically  non-existent.
hus,  by  focusing  on  the  Spanish  context  our  results  can
e  more  easily  extrapolated  to  other  Continental  European
ountries.  Second,  our  study  adds  to  the  tunnelling  litera-
ure  and  especially  to  the  few  papers  that  examine  direct
venues  through  which  expropriation  may  occur  in  the  Span-
sh  context  (de  Miguel  et  al.,  2005).  Third,  compared  to
rior  studies  in  the  area  that  focus  on  analysing  special
ypes  of  RPTs,  our  work  is  based  on  an  analysis  of  the  total
PTs  reported  by  listed  Spanish  ﬁrms  in  their  annual  corpo-
ate  governance  reports.  It  also  examines  a  longer  and  more
ecent  period,  which  allows  for  a  more  robust  interpretation
f  the  results.
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.
n  ‘‘Theoretical  background  and  hypothesis  development’’
ection,  we  show  the  theoretical  background  and  our
ypothesis  on  the  relation  between  RPTs  and  ﬁrm  value.
n  ‘‘Empirical  analysis’’  section,  we  address  the  empirical
nalysis.  In  ‘‘Sensitivity  analysis’’  section,  we  present  the
ensitivity  analysis  and  ﬁnally,  in  ‘‘Conclusion’’  section,  we
rovide  a  summary  and  conclude.
heoretical background and hypothesis
evelopment
iterature  reviewlated-party  transactions,  dominant  owners  and  ﬁrm  value.
07.002
wo  different  perspectives  might  help  to  explain  why
rms  commit  to  RPTs.  The  ﬁrst  one  considers  RPTs  as  an
fﬁcient  contracting  mechanism  in  incomplete  informa-
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Related-party  transactions,  dominant  owners  and  ﬁrm  value
tion  settings  (Ryngaert  and  Thomas,  2012).  According  to
this  view,  RPTs  play  a  signiﬁcant  role  in  a  market  econ-
omy,  contributing  to  meeting  ﬁrms’  basic  needs,  reducing
transaction  costs  and  facilitating  the  fulﬁlment  of  prop-
erty  rights  and  essential  contracts  for  the  ﬁrm  (Coase,
1937;  Fan  and  Goyal,  2006;  Fisman  and  Khanna,  2004;
Khanna  and  Palepu,  1997;  Khanna  and  Yafeh,  2005;  Kim,
2004;  Shin,  1999).  Thus,  in  the  presence  of  poorly  devel-
oped  external  markets  where  transaction  costs  are  high,
RPTs  might  contribute  to  improving  efﬁciency,  promoting
long-term  business  relations  and  reducing  uncertain  eco-
nomic  environments  and,  consequently,  ﬁrms’  risks  (Cook,
1977;  Khanna  and  Yafeh,  2005).  According  to  this  view,
Friedman  et  al.  (2003)  provide  evidence  of  propping  dur-
ing  the  Asian  ﬁnancial  crisis.  For  their  part,  Cheung  et  al.
(2006)  examine  RPTs  between  listed  Hong  Kong  companies
and  their  controlling  shareholders  and  ﬁnd  some  limited
examples  of  propping.  Moreover,  by  using  a  sample  of  Chi-
nese  listed  ﬁrms,  Wong  et  al.  (2015)  ﬁnd  that  related-party
sales  increase  ﬁrm  value.  However,  this  value  enhance-
ment  disappears  with  large  percentage  of  parent  directors,
high  government  ownership  or  tax  avoidance  incentives
that  often  couple  with  management’s  rent  extraction
activities.
The  opposite  perspective  considers  RPTs  as  a  vehicle  to
transfer  resources  from  the  company  to  its  related  parties
(Johnson  et  al.,  2000).  In  this  sense,  owner--managers  in
business  groups  have  strong  incentives  to  siphon  resources
out  of  member  ﬁrms  for  their  private  beneﬁt,  and  as  such,
they  use  both  investment  and  ﬁnancing  decisions  as  a  means
to  achieve  this  goal  (Bae  et  al.,  2002;  Baek  et  al.,  2006;
Bertrand  et  al.,  2002).  According  to  this  view,  some  previ-
ous  studies  show  that  particular  RPTs  such  as  related  lending,
related  party  sales  or  related  asset  exchanges  facilitate  tun-
nelling  (e.g.,  La  Porta  et  al.,  2003;  Gordon  et  al.,  2004;
Berkman  et  al.,  2009;  Jiang  et  al.,  2010;  Cheung  et  al.,
2009;  Ge  et  al.,  2010).  Other  studies  take  a  more  compre-
hensive  approach  by  focusing  on  a  larger  set  of  RPTs  and
evidence  that  RPTs  destroy  ﬁrm  value  (e.g.,  Lei  and  Song,
2011;  Kohlbeck  and  Mayhew,  2010).  However,  Cheung  et  al.
(2006)  fail  to  ﬁnd  that  ﬁrms  in  which  controlling  shareholders
do  expropriate  through  RPTs  trade  at  discounted  valuations
relative  to  other  ﬁrms.  Additionally,  other  authors  show  that
the  use  of  RPTs  to  tunnel  resources  outside  the  ﬁrm  is  more
severe  when  block  shareholders’  voting  rights  are  signif-
icantly  larger  than  their  cash  ﬂow  rights  (e.g.,  Bertrand
et  al.,  2002).
Finally,  some  studies  show  that  all  transactions  might  be
used  for  tunnelling  or  propping  depending  on  the  ﬁrm’s  spe-
ciﬁc  circumstances  such  as  ﬁnancial  healthy/distress  or  the
need  to  avoid  reporting  a  loss  or  to  raise  additional  capi-
tal  (e.g.,  Cheung  et  al.,  2009;  Peng  et  al.,  2011;  Lou  et  al.,
2014).
In  this  sense,  previous  empirical  evidence  reveals  no  con-
clusive  results  regarding  the  effect  of  RPTs  in  the  capital
markets.  Some  studies  ﬁnd  limited  evidence  from  the  use  of
RPTs  to  allow  propping  (Cheung  et  al.,  2006;  Friedman  et  al.,
2003;  Jian  and  Wong,  2010;  Lou  et  al.,  2014),  while  othersPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Bona-Sánchez,  C.,  et  al.,  Rel
BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2016,  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2016.
conclude  that  RPTs  are  a  tool  used  to  tunnel  resources  out-
side  the  ﬁrm  (Berkman  et  al.,  2009;  Cheung  et  al.,  2009;  Ge
et  al.,  2010;  Gordon  et  al.,  2004;  Jiang  et  al.,  2010;  Lei  and
Song,  2011).  Additionally,  some  studies  ﬁnd  that  RPTs  might
o
t
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3
e  used  by  insider  agents  for  either  tunnelling  or  propping
epending  on  certain  ﬁrms’  circumstances  (Cheung  et  al.,
009;  Friedman  et  al.,  2003;  Lou  et  al.,  2014;  Peng  et  al.,
011).
Furthermore,  while  some  studies  ﬁnd  that  the  effect  of
PTs  on  ﬁrm  performance  is  dependent  upon  the  related
arty  to  the  transaction  (Berkman  et  al.,  2009;  Jian  and
ong,  2010;  Kohlbeck  and  Mayhew,  2010),  most  studies
ocus  on  transactions  between  the  ﬁrm  and  their  block-
olders  (Cheung  et  al.,  2009,  2006;  Jiang  et  al.,  2010;  Lei
nd  Song,  2011;  Peng  et  al.,  2011).  Additionally,  previous
mpirical  evidence  focuses  mainly  on  the  Chinese  context
nd  therefore  on  a  setting  where  state  ownership  is  preva-
ent  and  ﬁrms  operate  in  a  state-controlled  economy,  or  on
ong  Kong,  where  shareholder’s  protection  is  relatively  good
nd  the  corporate  governance  environment  has  been  inﬂu-
nced  by  developments  in  the  United  Kingdom,  particularly
he  Cadbury  committee  report  on  corporate  governance
Cheung  et  al.,  2006).  Furthermore,  other  previous  studies
dopt  an  international  perspective,  which  makes  it  difﬁcult
o  disentangle  ﬁrm  level  from  country  level  effects.  Finally,
ecause  previous  studies  usually  include  distant  samples,
he  results  are  difﬁcult  to  extrapolate  to  the  current  period,
here  recent  regulatory  changes  have  taken  place  regarding
PTs.  In  view  of  the  preceding  considerations,  results  from
revious  studies  are  difﬁcult  to  extrapolate  to  Continental
urope.
PTs  in  Continental  Europe  and  Spain
herefore,  in  Continental  Europe  ﬁrms  operate  in  an
nvironment  with  weak  investor  protection,  limited  devel-
pment  of  capital  markets  and  a  large  presence  of
hareholders  with  the  ability  and  incentives  to  inﬂuence
orporate  decisions.  Thus,  contrary  to  the  market-based  sys-
em  of  the  US,  in  the  control-based  system  of  Continental
urope,  control  is  assumed  to  be  exercised  by  blockholders
ecause  the  board  of  directors  is  controlled  by  direc-
ors  linked  to  core  shareholders  (Cuervo,  2002).  Therefore,
wnership  of  the  typical  ﬁrm  in  Continental  Europe  is  gen-
rally  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  family  and  banks  who
re  often  actively  involved  in  managing  the  ﬁrm  (Cuervo,
002;  Faccio  and  Lang,  2002;  La  Porta  et  al.,  1999).  To
he  extent  that  dominant  owners  have  a  large  part  of  their
ealth  directly  tied  to  the  ﬁrm,  they  will  have  strong  incen-
ives  to  monitor  the  ﬁrm  closely.  Ownership  concentration  is
herefore  expected  to  reduce  the  agency  conﬂict  between
hareholders  and  managers.  However,  it  is  also  expected  to
ncrease  the  divergence  of  interests  between  insiders  (man-
gers  and  dominant  shareholders)  and  minority  shareholders
ecause  the  latter  are  at  risk  of  expropriation  by  the  former
Johnson  et  al.,  2000;  Villalonga  and  Amit,  2006).  There-
ore,  the  Spanish  institutional  environment  is  characterized
y  high  levels  of  ownership  concentration,  low  effectiveness
f  boards  due  to  a  single-tier  structure,  relatively  illiquidity
f  the  capital  market,  which  impedes  minority  shareholders
rom  selling  out  when  they  perceive  abuses  by  controllingated-party  transactions,  dominant  owners  and  ﬁrm  value.
07.002
wners,  and  the  weakness  of  the  market  for  corporate  con-
rol  (de  Miguel  et  al.,  2005).
Furthermore,  the  use  of  pyramids,  which  result  in  the
eparation  of  the  controlling  owner’s  voting  and  cash  ﬂow
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ights  is  common  in  Continental  Europe  (e.g.,  Claessens
t  al.,  2000;  Faccio  and  Lang,  2002;  La  Porta  et  al.,  1999).
yramids  allow  controlling  owners  to  maintain  tight  control
f  a  ﬁrm  while  committing  low  equity  investment,  creating
 separation  of  ownership  (cash  ﬂow)  and  control  (vot-
ng  rights).  This  ownership  structure  and  the  controlling
hareholders’  ability  to  recruit  and  nominate  directors  who
ill  serve  their  interests  might  increase  the  potential  for
buse  through  RPTs  in  the  Spanish  context.  de  Miguel  et  al.
2005)  point  out  that  the  theoretical  relation  between  large
wners  and  ﬁrm  value  is  ambiguous  and  they  provide  evi-
ence  of  minority  shareholders’  rent  expropriation  for  high
evels  of  ownership  concentration  in  the  Spanish  context.
evertheless,  no  previous  studies  have  analyzed  blockhold-
rs’  commitment  to  RPTs  and  the  potential  effect  of  these
elated  transactions  on  ﬁrm  value  in  the  Spanish  context.
Although  according  to  the  incentive  alignment  hypothesis
Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976)  large  shareholders  have  greater
ower  and  stronger  incentives  to  ensure  shareholder  value
aximization,  the  potential  private  beneﬁts  derived  from
ontrolling  shareholders  through  expropriation  of  minority
hareholders’  wealth  by  using  RPTs  could  be  greater  than
he  costs  stemming  from  tunnelling  through  these  transac-
ions.  When  this  happens  a  self-dealing  scenario  is  likely
o  arise.  On  the  contrary,  tunnelling  activities  are  subject
o  public  scrutiny  and  when  detected  might  convey  regula-
ory  actions  and  a  reputation  loss  for  the  company  (Klapper
nd  Love,  2004;  Gomes,  2000).  In  the  Spanish  context,  con-
rolling  shareholders,  mainly  families  and  banks  (Cuervo,
002;  Faccio  and  Lang,  2002;  La  Porta  et  al.,  1999),  due
o  their  large  stakes  and  long  investment  horizons  (Cuervo,
002),  will  view  a  company’s  health  as  an  extension  of  their
wn  well-being.  This  long-term  horizon  increases  concerns
bout  ﬁrms’  reputation.  Reputation  may  be  of  particular
alue  when  capital  markets  are  less  developed  and  trust-
ased  relationships  are  key  to  concluding  contracts  (Khanna
nd  Palepu,  2000).  According  to  this  latter  perspective  and
ollowing  the  arguments  of  Anderson  and  Reeb  (2003),  com-
ared  with  other  shareholders,  controlling  shareholders  are
ore  likely  to  use  RPTs  efﬁciently  in  order  to  maximize  ﬁrm
alue.
Therefore,  RPTs  in  the  Spanish  setting  can  be  used  by  con-
rolling  shareholders  to  both  generate  and  destroy  value.
he  direction  of  the  relationship  between  RPTs  and  ﬁrm
alue  is  therefore  an  empirical  question.  We  therefore  state
ur  hypothesis  as  follows:
1.  RPTs  affect  ﬁrm  value.
mpirical analysis
ample
he  ﬁnancial  data  are  taken  from  Osiris  database  by  Bureau
an  Dijk  Electronic  Publishing  (BvDEP).  We  hand  collect  data
bout  RPTs  because  this  information  is  not  publicly  avail-
ble.  The  sample  comprises  a  non-balanced  panel  of  99Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Bona-Sánchez,  C.,  et  al.,  Re
BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2016,  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2016.
on-ﬁnancial  Spanish  ﬁrms  listed  on  the  electronic  market
t  the  end  of  2012.  In  our  regression  analysis,  we  apply
he  method  developed  by  Hadi  (1992)  to  eliminate  outliers,
hich  represent  14.8%  of  the  total  sample.  As  a  result,  we
a
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btain  an  unbalanced  panel  of  94  companies  (671  ﬁrm-year
bservations)  for  the  period  2004--2012.  Because  disclosures
f  related  party  transactions  are  incomplete  and  irregular
n  2003,  we  exclude  this  year  from  our  analysis.  To  alleviate
he  sample  selection  bias  and  to  test  whether  there  is  some
alidity  for  the  aforementioned  transaction  costs  theory,  all
he  ﬁrms  have  been  included  in  the  sample  regardless  of
hether  they  have  committed  to  RPTs.
ariables  deﬁnitions
elated-party  transactions
ome  previous  studies  have  focused  on  speciﬁc  RPTs  such
s  acquisitions  or  sales  of  assets,  lending  or  borrowing  con-
racts,  loan  guarantees  (Berkman  et  al.,  2009;  Cheung  et  al.,
009;  Friedman  et  al.,  2003;  Ge  et  al.,  2010;  Jiang  et  al.,
010).  Other  studies  provide  a  broader  scope  by  consider-
ng  a  comprehensive  set  of  RPT  variables  (Cheung  et  al.,
009,  2006;  Kohlbeck  and  Mayhew,  2010;  Peng  et  al.,  2011).
ithin  this  latter  category,  the  authors  usually  use,  together
r  separately,  two  classiﬁcation  criteria  to  group  RPTs:  (1)
he  related  party  of  the  transaction  and  (2)  the  nature  of
he  transaction  (Kohlbeck  and  Mayhew,  2010).
Following  the  ﬁrst  criterion,  some  authors  (Kohlbeck  and
ayhew,  2010) group  these  transactions  in:  (a)  transac-
ions  with  directors,  ofﬁcers,  shareholders  or  their  afﬁliates
nd  (b)  investment  (joint  venture  or  other  operations  in
hich  the  company  has  a  less  than  100%  that  is  not  con-
olidated).  Nekhili  and  Cherif  (2011)  group  these  operations
n:  (a)  transactions  between  the  main  shareholders,  direc-
ors  or  managers,  and  the  companies  with  which  they  are
fﬁliated  (b)  transactions  with  subsidiaries  and  associated
rms.
According  to  the  second  criterion,  Kohlbeck  and  Mayhew
2010)  classify  RPTs  as  simple  and  complex  operations.
imple  transactions  are  straightforward  transactions  that
nvolve  relatively  few  ﬁnancial  statement  accounts  and
elated  parties  (loans,  guarantees,  borrowings,  consulting,
egal  services  and  leases).  Complex  transactions  typically
nvolve  a  number  of  ﬁnancial  statement  accounts  and
elated  parties  (related  business,  unrelated  business,  over-
ead,  and  stock  transactions).  In  other  studies,  RPTs  are
nitially  sorted  into  two  groups  (Cheung  et  al.,  2009):  (1)  ex
nte  potentially  tunnelling  transactions,  (2)  ex  ante  poten-
ially  propping  transactions.  A  third  type  of  transaction  is
onsidered  by  Cheung  et  al.  (2006)  transactions  that  could
ave  a  strategic  rationale.
In our  study,  information  about  RPTs  is  collected  from
nnual  corporate  governance  reports  (CGR)  published  by
he  Spanish  Security  Exchange  Commission  over  the  period
004--2012.  The  CGR  includes  RPTs  with  (1)  signiﬁcant  share-
olders,  (2)  directors  and  ofﬁcers,  and  (3)  afﬁliates  (not
ncluded  in  the  consolidation  process).  Because  the  sec-
nd  and  third  types  of  RPTs  are  practically  non-existent,  we
ocused  on  RPTs  with  blockholders,  which  represent  99.84%
f  total  RPTs  in  Spain.  Thus,  we  initially  obtain  17  RPT  varia-
les.  Following  previous  studies  (Peng  et  al.,  2011;  Ryngaertlated-party  transactions,  dominant  owners  and  ﬁrm  value.
07.002
nd  Thomas,  2012),  we  apply  a  screening  process  in  order  to
nsure  the  robustness  of  our  results.  We  thus  exclude  those
PT  variables  that  present  an  insigniﬁcant  amount  or  erratic
ehaviour.  This  screening  process  results  in  a  ﬁnal  set  of
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Related-party  transactions,  dominant  owners  and  ﬁrm  value
eight  RPT  variables:  operating  income,  operating  expenses,
ﬁnancial  income,  ﬁnancial  expenses,  borrowing  contracts,
lending  contracts,  loan  guarantees  and  non-ﬁnancial  assets
acquisitions.  Regarding  these  variables,  we  do  not  we  have
a  priori  expectation  on  the  effect  of  the  analyzed  connected
transactions  on  ﬁrm  value  because,  according  to  previous  lit-
erature,  tunnelling  opportunities  are  diverse  and  the  same
transaction  can  often  be  used  for  tunnelling  and/or  prop-
ping  depending  on  certain  ﬁrm’s  circumstances  (Peng  et  al.,
2011).  Moreover,  because  the  use  of  the  same  transaction  for
tunnelling  or  propping  is  dependent  upon  the  transfer  prices
not  always  disclosed  by  the  ﬁrm,  in  the  Spanish  context  and
in  contrast  to  previous  literature,  we  do  not  classify  RPTs  as
potentially  tunnelling/propping  transactions.
Independent  variable
We  capture  ﬁrm  value  using  three  different  variables.  First,
we  use  Tobin’s  Q,  which  is  calculated  as  the  ﬁrm’s  market
capitalization  plus  debt,  divided  by  the  book  value  of  assets
(Cho,  1998;  Claessens  et  al.,  2002;  Demsetz  and  Villalonga,
2001;  Ferreira  and  Matos,  2008;  McConnell  and  Servaes,
1990;  Morck  et  al.,  1988;  Ruiz-Mallorqui  and  Santana-Martin,
2011;  Seifert  et  al.,  2005).  Second,  we  use  the  ﬁrm’s  equal-
weighted  market-adjusted  cumulative  monthly  stock  return
for  the  12-month  period  ending  three  months  following  the
end  of  the  ﬁscal  year  (CAR) (Cheung  et  al.,  2006;  Jiang  et  al.,
2010;  Kohlbeck  and  Mayhew,  2010;  Lei  and  Song,  2011).
Finally,  due  to  the  relatively  illiquidity  of  the  Spanish  capital
market,  we  use  the  market  value  of  shares  scaled  by  total
assets  (de  Miguel  et  al.,  2004).
Control  variables
We  include  in  our  analysis  a  set  of  control  variables  com-
monly  used  in  previous  studies  as  potential  determinants
of  ﬁrm  value  (Ruiz-Mallorqui  and  Santana-Martin,  2011;
Mínguez-Vera  and  Martín-Ugedo,  2007;  Navissi  and  Naiker,
2006;  Villalonga  and  Amit,  2006;  Seifert  et  al.,  2005;
Eisenberg  et  al.,  1998;  Yermack,  1996;  McConnell  and
Servaes,  1990).  Thus,  since  controlling  owners  often  use
pyramidal  structures  to  maintain  tight  control  of  a  ﬁrm
while  committing  low  equity  investment  creating,  in  this
way,  a  separation  of  ownership  (cash  ﬂow)  and  control  (vot-
ing  rights),  we  have  controlled,  in  our  empirical  analysis,
for  the  effect  of  ownership  structure  on  the  investigated
relationship  by  including  the  controlling  owner’s  voting-cash
ﬂow  wedge  (DIVERG).  To  further  control  for  the  potential
effect  of  ownership  structure  we  include  FAM, a  dummy
variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1  if  the  controlling  share-
holder  of  the  ﬁrm  is  a  family  and  0  otherwise;  and  INST,
a  dummy  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1  if  the  control-
ling  shareholder  of  the  ﬁrm  is  a  ﬁnancial  institution  and  0
otherwise.  We  use  the  control  chain  methodology  to  iden-
tify  the  dominant  owner  for  each  ﬁrm  and  determine  if
the  corresponding  owner  exercises  effective  control  through
a  pyramidal  structure  (Bona-Sánchez  et  al.,  2013,  2014;
Faccio  and  Lang,  2002;  Claessens  et  al.,  2000;  La  Porta  et  al.,
1999).  Moreover,  since  previous  literature  has  consideredPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Bona-Sánchez,  C.,  et  al.,  Rel
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the  size  of  the  board  as  an  important  factor  affecting  the
board’s  ability  to  function  effectively  we  include  BOARD,
the  natural  logarithm  of  the  total  members  on  the  board.
To  build  this  variable,  we  collected  data  from  annual
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orporate  governance  reports  published  by  the  Spanish  Secu-
ity  Exchange  Commission  (Bona-Sánchez  et  al.,  2014,  2013).
e  also  include  the  size  of  the  ﬁrm  (SIZE), which  is  measured
s  the  logarithm  of  ﬁrm’s  assets,  and  ﬁrm’s  leverage  (LEV),
easured  as  the  relationship  between  ﬁrms’  total  debt  and
ssets.  Finally,  dummy  variables  are  included  to  take  into
ccount  industry  and  year  effects.
escriptive  analysis
able  1  (Panel  A)  shows  the  percentage  of  ﬁrm-year  RPTs
bservations  along  the  period  and  the  number  of  RPTs,
lassiﬁed  by  nature.  Since  individual  companies  sometimes
ngage  in  the  same  type  of  RPT  in  the  same  year,  we
ave  summarized  the  value  of  RPTs  occurring  for  the  same
ompany  in  the  same  year  in  order  to  obtain  ﬁrm-year
bservations.  Thus,  Table  1  (Panel  A)  shows  that  the  most
requent  RPTs  are  Operating  Income  (OI)  and  Operating
xpenses  (OE),  followed  by  Financial  Income  (FI),  Finan-
ial  Expenses  (FE),  Borrowing  Contracts  (BORROW)  and
oan  Guarantees  (LG).  Thus,  Lending  Contracts  (LEND) and
on-ﬁnancial  Acquisitions  (AA)  are  less  common.  How-
ver,  considering  the  average  amount  of  RPTs  in  Table  1
Panel  B),  we  observe  that  the  most  relevant  average  RPTs,
re  Lending  Contracts  (LEND) (50,893.880  thousand  euros),
perating  Expenses  (OE)  (44,262.530  thousand  euros),
perating  Income  (OI)  (31,847.960  thousand  euros),  Loan
uarantees  (LG)  (17,214.970  thousand  euros)  and  Borrow-
ng  Contracts  (BORROW)  (15,287.270  thousand  euros)  and
he  rest  average  RPTs  values  do  not  exceed  5000  thousand
uros.
Table  1  (Panel  B)  shows  that  the  average  values  for
rm  value  are  1.558  (QTOBIN),  0.893  (MKVALUE)  and  −0.07
CAR).  Table  1 (Panel  C)  reveals  the  percentage  of  family
ontrolled  ﬁrms  and  the  percentage  of  ﬁrms  controlled  by
 ﬁnancial  institution.  In  Table  1  (Panel  D)  we  observe  that
rm  value  is  negatively  correlated  with  all  the  RPT  variables.
he  high  correlation  among  the  variables  used  to  measure
rm  value  is  not  a  concern  in  our  study  because  these  varia-
les  are  never  included  in  the  same  model.  However,  we
ee  very  high  levels  of  correlations  among  the  RPT  varia-
les.  For  example,  correlation  between  operating  income
nd  operating  expenses  is  0.52;  correlation  between  ﬁnan-
ial  income  and  ﬁnancial  expenses  is  0.48;  and  correlation
etween  lending  contracts  and  ﬁnancial  expenses  is  0.46.
oreover,  in  other  ﬁve  cases,  the  correlations  are  higher
han  0.30.  Thus,  we  conclude  that  there  is  a  potential  multi-
ollinearity  problem  that  misleadingly  inﬂates  the  standard
rrors  and  so  makes  some  variables  statistically  insigniﬁ-
ant  while  they  should  be  otherwise  signiﬁcant.  To  avoid  this
roblem  the  principal  components  analysis  (PCA)  method  is
pplied.
rincipal  components  analysis
he  main  objective  of  the  PCA  is  to  determine  the  impor-
ant  dimensions  that  can  explain  the  changes  in  RPTs.ated-party  transactions,  dominant  owners  and  ﬁrm  value.
07.002
CA  explores  underlying  patterns  of  relationships  between
he  RPTs,  which  generates  new  variables  (factors)  that
re  uncorrelated  with  one  another  and  that  avoid  the
ulticollinearity  problem  in  our  regressions.  To  apply  the
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Table  1  Descriptive  statistics  and  correlation  matrix.
Panel  A.  Descriptive  data  on  RPTs
RPTs  Firm-year  RPTs  (%)  Number  of  RPTs
OI  27.05  241
OE 29.41  262
FI 10.33  92
FE 14.61  129
BORROW 14.04  124
LEND 7.11  63
LG 11.22  100
AA 7.93  70
Panel B.  Descriptive  statistics
Variable  Average  Standard  deviation  Median  Minimum  Maximum
OI  31,847.96  144,290.90  0  0  1,600,000.00
OE 44,262.53  273,306.60  0  0  4,000,000.00
FI 1926.46  17,172.71  0  0  334,236.00
FE 1722.92  9057.75  0  0  128,978.00
BORROW 15,287.27  131,228.90  0  0  2,200,000.00
LEND 50,893.88  243,242.10  0  0  3,200,000.00
LG 17,214.97  108,613.80  0  0  1,500,000.00
AA 4178.97  52,528.35  0  0  1,300,000.00
QTOBIN 1.558  1.222  1.232  0.455  12.481
MKVALUE 0.893  1.260  0.54  0.0085  11.73
CAR −0.07  0.450  −0.01  −3.3  2.92
DIVERG 3.970  6.820  0  0  36.29
BOARD 2.340  0.304  2.302  1.386  3.04
SIZE 13.864  1.832  13.624  9.791  18.68
LEV 0.642  0.183  0.652  0.068  0.986
Panel C.  Firms  controlled  by  a  family  and  ﬁrms  controlled  by  a  ﬁnancial  institution
Firms  controlled  by  a  family  61.70%
Firms controlled  by  a  ﬁnancial  institution  15.80%
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Table  1  (Continued)
Panel  D.  Correlation  matrix
OI  OE  FI  FE  BORROW  LEND  LG  AA  QTOBIN MKVALUE CAR  DIVERG  FAM INST  BOARD  SIZE
OE  0.52
FI 0.12 0.15
FE 0.21 0.29 0.48
BORROW  0.28 0.14 0.33 0.33
LEND  0.25 0.31 0.26 0.46 0.31
LG 0.19 0.32 0.24 0.29 0.22 0.35
AA  0.04  0.11  0.10  0.06  −0.01  0.17  0.02
QTOBIN −0.04  −0.05  −0.03  −0.06  −0.03  −0.04  −0.02  −0.01  1.00
MKVALUE −0.02  −0.02  −0.03  −0.06  −0.02  −0.03  −0.00  −0.02  0.93
CAR −0.02  −0.04  −0.03  −0.01  −0.03  −0.05  −0.06  −0.02  0.45  0.46
DIVERG 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.00 −0.02  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.08  0.05  −0.06
FAM −0.24 −0.23 −0.05 −0.23  −0.25  −0.14  −0.14  −0.06  0.00  −0.02  −0.12  0.19
INST 0.25 0.27 0.05 0.28 0.29  0.14  0.19  0.08  −0.02  0.00  0.04  −0.10  −0.70
BOARD 0.18 0.21 0.14 0.20  0.27  0.14  0.19  0.11  −0.03  −0.11  0.06  0.16  −0.09  0.21
SIZE 0.31 0.30 0.24 0.32  0.25  0.37  0.28  0.14  −0.11  −0.26  0.06  0.15  −0.11  0.07  0.63
LEV 0.04 −0.01 0.01 0.04  0.08  0.05  0.08  0.03  0.01  −0.27  0.09  0.03  0.02  −0.05  0.22  0.42
OI: operating income; OE:  operating expenses; FI: ﬁnancial income; FE:  ﬁnancial expenses; BORROW: borrowing contracts; LEND: lending contracts; LG:  loan guarantees; AA:  non-ﬁnancial
assets acquisitions; QTOBIN: value of the ﬁrm, measured as the relationship between capitalisation and debt value and the total assets of the ﬁrm i in year t; MKVALUEit is the market
value of shares scaled by total assets; CARit is the ﬁrm’s equal-weighted market-adjusted cumulative monthly stock return for the 12-month period ending three months following the end
of the ﬁscal year; FAMit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the controlling shareholder of the ﬁrm is a family and 0 otherwise; INSTit is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if the controlling shareholder of the ﬁrm is a ﬁnancial institution and 0 otherwise; BOARDit is the natural logarithm of the total members on the board; SIZEit is the natural logarithm
of the total assets; LEVit is total debt in year t divided by total assets.
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Table  2  KMO  and  Bartlett’s  test.
Kaiser--Meyer--Olkin  measure  of  sampling
adequacy
0.717
Bartlett’s  test  of  sphericity Chi-square  1207.851
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Table  3  Eigenvalues  and  variances  of  the  factors.
Factors  Eigenvalue  Variance
(%)
Cumulative
variance  (%)
1  2.684  34.556  33.556
2 1.155 24.435 58.991
3 1.011 19.641 78.632
4 0.889  6.110  84.742
5 0.737  4.223  88.965
6 0.658  4.216  93.181
7 0.446  3.573  96.754
s
t
f
S
u
f
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t
TSig.  0.000
CA  methodology  initial  variables  measuring  RPTs  must  be
orrelated  with  one  another.  Although  we  observed  high
orrelation  among  the  RPTs  in  Table  1,  we  further  evalu-
te  whether  the  data  are  appropriate  for  factor  analysis
y  using  the  Kaiser--Meyer--Olkin  (KMO)  measure  of  samp-
ing  adequacy  and  Bartlett’s  test  of  sphericity.  Thus,  the
MO  value  should  be  higher  than  0.50  and  the  chi-square
alue  of  Bartlett’s  test  must  be  signiﬁcant  at  the  0.05  level
Harper  et  al.,  1980).  As  shown  in  Table  2,  the  KMO  statis-
ic  is  0.717,  a  value  higher  than  the  recommended  0.50,
nd  Bartlett’s  test  is  statistically  signiﬁcant  at  the  p  <  0.01
evel.  These  results  show  that  the  sample  can  be  subjected
o  PCA  in  order  to  uncover  the  underlying  patterns  of  the
PT  variables.
Table  3,  presents  the  estimated  factors  and  their  eigen-
alues.  The  criterion  used  for  the  number  of  factors  to  bePlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Bona-Sánchez,  C.,  et  al.,  Re
BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2016,  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2016.
xtracted  is  an  eigenvalue  greater  than  1.  Thus,  the  ﬁrst
hree  factors  are  included  in  the  model.  The  ﬁrst  factor
s  the  most  important  dimension  in  explaining  changes  in
PTs.  It  explains  34.556%  of  the  total  variance  of  RPTs.  The
i
t
t
a
Table  4  Rotated  components  matrix.
Factor  1.  Financial  dimension  Factor  2.  
FI  0.775
FE 0.769
LEND  0.617
BORROW  0.596
LG 0.449
OE 0.837
OI 0.834
Aa 
FI: ﬁnancial income; FE:  ﬁnancial expenses; LEND: lending contracts; B
expenses; OI:  operating income; AA:  assets acquisitions.
Table  5  Factor  score  coefﬁcients  matrix.
Factor  1.  Financial  dimension  Factor  2.  
AA  −0.030  −0.016  
OI −0.130  0.561  
OE −0.110  0.548  
FE 0.377  −0.068  
FI 0.43  −0.239  
LG 0.167  0.124  
BORROW 0.304  −0.036  
LEND 0.240  0.089  
AA: non-ﬁnancial asset acquisitions; OI:  operating income; OE:  opera
lending guarantee; BORROW: borrowing contracts; LEND: lending cont8 0.420  3.245  100.000
econd  and  third  factors  explain  24.435%  and  19.641%  of
he  total  variance,  respectively.  Considered  together,  the
actors  explain  78.632%  of  the  total  changes  of  RPTs  for  the
panish  public  ﬁrms.
In Table  4,  we  show  the  three  principal  factors  rotated
sing  the  Varimax  normalization  (Kaiser,  1960).  The  ﬁrst
actor  consists  of  ﬁve  RPT  variables:  ﬁnancial  income  (FI),
nancial  expenses  (FE),  borrowing  contracts  (BORROW),
ending  contracts  (LEND), and  loan  guarantees  (LG).  Hence,
he  ﬁrst  factor  represents  the  ﬁnancial  dimension  of  RPTs.
he  second  factor  consists  of  two  RPT  variables:  operatinglated-party  transactions,  dominant  owners  and  ﬁrm  value.
07.002
ncome  (OI)  and  operating  expenses  (OE).  Thus,  this  fac-
or  represents  the  operating  dimension  of  RPTs.  Finally,  the
hird  factor  includes  non-ﬁnancial  asset  acquisitions  (AA)
mong  related  parties  (investment  dimension).
Operating  dimension  Factor  3.  Investment  dimension
0.978
ORROW: borrowing contracts; LG:  loan guarantees; OE:  operating
Operating  dimension  Factor  3.  Investment  dimension
0.963
−0.084
0.052
0.016
0.028
−0.024
−0.180
0.122
ting expenses; FE:  ﬁnancial expenses; FI: ﬁnancial income; LG:
racts.
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Related-party  transactions,  dominant  owners  and  ﬁrm  value
Table  5  presents  the  factor  score  coefﬁcient  matrix  esti-
mated  by  PCA.  Thus,  estimated  factors  can  be  expressed  as  a
function  of  the  observed  original  RPT  variables.  To  estimate
each  factor  score  for  each  ﬁrm,  the  following  equations  must
be  used:
RPT F1 = −0.030xAAit −  0.130xIEit −  0.110xOEit
+  0.377xFEit +  0.4356xFIit +  0.167xLGit
+  0.304xBORROWit +  0.240xLENDit (1)
RPT F2 = −0.016xAAit +  0.561xOIit +  0.548itOEit
−  0.068xFEit −  0.239xFI  +  0.124xLGit
−  0.036xBORROWit +  0.089xLENDit (2)
RPT  F3  =  0.963xAAit −  0.84xOIit +  0.052xOEit
+  0.016xFEit +  0.028xFIit −  0.024xLGit
−  0.180xBORROWit +  0.122xLENDit (3)
where  RPT  F1  is  the  ﬁnancial  dimension  of  RPTs,  RPT  F2  is
the  operating  dimension  of  RPTs  and  RPT  F3  is  the  invest-
ment  dimension  of  RPTs.
Results
We  estimate  all  of  the  regressions  using  a  panel  data  proce-
dure,  namely,  generalized  method  of  moments  (GMM).  The
GMM  procedure  allows  us  to  address  potential  endogeneity
problems  by  using  the  right-hand-side  variables  in  the  model
lagged  two  to  six  times  as  instruments;  the  only  exceptions
are  the  year  and  industry  effects  variables,  which  are  con-
sidered  exogenous.  The  original  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)
approach  can  perform  poorly,  however,  if  the  autoregressive
parameters  are  too  large  or  the  ratio  of  the  variance  of  the
panel-level  effect  to  the  variance  of  the  idiosyncratic  error
is  too  large.  Drawing  on  Arellano  and  Bover  (1995),  Blundell
and  Bonds  (1998)  develop  a  system  GMM  estimator  that
addresses  these  problems  by  expanding  the  instrument  list
to  include  instruments  for  the  level  equation.  In  this  paper,
we  use  the  system  GMM  approach  to  estimate  our  models.2
The  consistency  of  GMM  estimates  depends  on  both  an
absence  of  second-order  serial  autocorrelation  in  the  resid-
uals  and  on  the  validity  of  the  instruments.  To  check  for
potential  model  misspeciﬁcation,  we  use  the  Hansen  statis-
tic  of  over-identifying  restrictions.  We  next  examine  the  m2
statistic  developed  by  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)  to  test  for
the  absence  of  second-order  serial  correlation  in  the  ﬁrst-
difference  residual.  Finally,  we  conduct  three  Wald  tests,
speciﬁcally,  a  Wald  test  of  the  joint  signiﬁcance  of  thePlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Bona-Sánchez,  C.,  et  al.,  Rel
BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2016,  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2016.
reported  coefﬁcients  (z1),  a  Wald  test  of  the  joint  signiﬁ-
cance  of  the  time  dummies  (z2)  and  a  Wald  test  of  the  joint
signiﬁcance  of  the  industry  dummies  (z3).
2 More precisely, we use the two-step system of GMM estima-
tion included in the xtabond2 stata routine written by Roodman
(2008). The two-step estimation estimates the regression with
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
a
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To  test  our  hypothesis  we  estimate  the  following  model:
irmValueit =  ˛o +  ˛1RPT  F1it +  ˛2RPT  F2it +  ˛3RPT  F3it
+  ˛4DIVERGit +  ˛5FAMit +  ˛6INSTit
+  ˛7BOARDit +  ˛8SIZEit +  ˛9LEVit
+  k +  j +  εi (4)
here  k and  j control  for  industry  and  year  effects,  respec-
ively.
Models  1,  2  and  3  in  Table  6  report  results  on  the  effect  of
PTs  on  ﬁrm  value.  In  particular,  the  models  show  a  negative
nd  statistically  signiﬁcant  effect  of  the  different  dimen-
ions  of  RPTs  on  ﬁrm  value.  These  results  are  consistent
ith  our  hypothesis.  Particularly,  we  provide  evidence  of
 negative  relationship  between  RPTs  and  ﬁrm  value.  The
esults  are  consistent  with  the  use  of  RPTs  as  a  mechanism
o  expropriate  minority  shareholders’  wealth.
Regarding  the  corporate  governance  variables,  results  in
able  6  reveal  that  the  dominant  shareholder’s  voting-cash
ow  wedge  has  a  statistically  signiﬁcant  negative  effect
n  ﬁrm  value.  These  results  are  consistent  with  divergence
ncreasing  the  dominant  shareholder’s  incentives  to  tunnel
esources  outside  the  ﬁrm  (e.g.,  Bona-Sánchez  et  al.,  2013;
laessens  et  al.,  2002;  Francis  et  al.,  2005;  Haw  et  al.,
004),  since  the  voting-cash  ﬂow  wedge  allows  for  greater
ontrol  of  corporate  wealth  with  less  investment  by  the  con-
rolling  owner  (Morck  et  al.,  2005).  Moreover,  the  inﬂuence
f  family  control  on  ﬁrm  value  is  positive  while  the  effect
f  effective  control  by  a dominant  institutional  owner  is
egative.  These  results  are  consistent  with  previous  stud-
es  (Ruiz-Mallorqui  and  Santana-Martin,  2011;  Villalonga  and
mit,  2006;  Navissi  and  Naiker,  2006;  Seifert  et  al.,  2005;
cConnell  and  Servaes,  1990).  With  respect  to  board  size
BOARD),  the  effect  on  ﬁrm  value  is  negative.  This  result  is
onsistent  with  an  increase  in  board  size  negatively  affect-
ng  the  board’s  ability  to  function  effectively  (Eisenberg
t  al.,  1998;  Yermack,  1996).  Regarding  the  rest  of  the  con-
rol  variables,  size  displays  a  negative  effect  on  ﬁrm  value,
hile  the  effect  of  leverage  is  positive.
ensitivity analysis
o  check  the  robustness  of  our  results  we  extend  our  analy-
is  in  two  ways.  First,  by  considering  if  our  results  might  be
ffected  by  the  implementation  of  International  Financial
eporting  Standards  (IFRS).  Thus,  we  re-run  all  our  regres-
ions  considering  only  the  period  affected  by  IFRS,  namely
005--2012.  As  we  can  see  in  Table  7,  the  ﬁndings  are  not
ifferent  from  those  obtained  in  Table  6.  Second,  we  re-run
ll  the  regressions  including  the  RPT  variables  one  by  one.
ntabulated  results  show  that  the  effect  of  RPTs  on  ﬁrm
alue  is  still  negative  (size  and  leverage  are  not  signiﬁcantated-party  transactions,  dominant  owners  and  ﬁrm  value.
07.002
n  some  regressions).3 Thus,  we  provide  further  evidence  in
upport  of  our  hypothesis.
3 Tables are available upon request.
Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Bona-Sánchez,  C.,  et  al.,  Related-party  transactions,  dominant  owners  and  ﬁrm  value.
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Table  6  Related-party  transactions  and  ﬁrm  value.
Model 1:
QTobinit=˛o + ˛1RPT F1it + ˛2RPT F2it + ˛3RPT F3it + ˛4DIVERGit + ˛5FAMit+˛6INSTit + ˛7BOARDit + ˛8SIZEit + ˛9LEVit + k + j + εi
Model 2:
CARit = ˛o + ˛1RPT F1it + ˛2RPT F2it + ˛3RPT F3it + ˛4DIVERGit + ˛5FAMit + ˛6INSTit + ˛7BOARDit + ˛8SIZEit + ˛9LEVit + k + j + εi
Model 3:
MKVALUEit=˛o + ˛1RPT F1it + ˛2RPT F2it + ˛3RPT F3it+˛4DIVERGit + ˛5FAMit+˛6INSTit + ˛7BOARDit + ˛8SIZEit + ˛9LEVit+k + j + εi
Model  1  Model  2  Model  3
RPT  F1it −0.09*** −0.029*** −0.094***
(−9.48)  (−5.69)  (−7.44)
RPT F2it −0.09*** −0.016*** −0.124***
(−11.72)  (−3.02)  (−9.63)
RPT F3it −0.06*** −0.027*** −0.03***
(−7.17)  (−2.89)  (−4.17)
DIVERGit −0.01*** −0.01*** −0.02***
(−15.39)  (−7.47)  (−3.03)
FAMit 0.128*** 0.25*** 0.07***
(5.54)  (4.09)  (2.00)
INSTit −0.06*** −0.454*** −0.106***
(−4.06)  (−7.50)  (−5.46)
BOARDit −0.127*** −0.612*** −0.227***
(−4.06)  (−8.44)  (−7.29)
SIZEit −0.237*** −0.08*** −0.31***
(−14.59)  (−5.12)  (−12.21)
LEVit 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.220***
(10.46)  (7.65)  (8.87)
Constant 3.89*** −0.04  5.24
(17.67) (−0.17)  (15.53)
Year effect  Yes  Yes  Yes
Industry effect  Yes  Yes  Yes
Hansen 71.77  21.19  60.13
(0.54) (0.569)  (0.463)
m2 test  −1.02  −1.31  −0.75
(0.30) (0.191)  (0.453)
z1 test  390.42*** 543.06*** 217.18***
z2  test  7.26*** 31.68*** 9.04***
z3  test  65.20*** 91.43*** 58.31***
QTOBIN: value of the ﬁrm, measured as the relationship between capitalization and debt value and the total assets of the ﬁrm i in year
t; RPT F1 is the ﬁnancial dimension of RPTs. RPT F2 is the operating dimension of RPTs. RPT F3 is the investment dimension of RPTs.
QTOBIN: value of the ﬁrm, measured as the relationship between capitalisation and debt value and the total assets of the ﬁrm i in year t;
MKVALUEit is the market value of shares scaled by total assets; CARit is the ﬁrm’s equal-weighted market-adjusted cumulative monthly
stock return for the 12-month period ending three months following the end of the ﬁscal year; FAMit is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 if the controlling shareholder of the ﬁrm is a family and 0 otherwise; INSTit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
the controlling shareholder of the ﬁrm is a ﬁnancial institution and 0 otherwise; BOARDit is the natural logarithm of the total members
on the board; SIZEit is the natural logarithm of the total assets; LEVit is total debt in year t divided by total assets.
Hansen is the test of over-identifying restrictions, under the null hypothesis that all instruments are uncorrelated with the disturbance
process. m2 is the statistic test for lack of second-order serial correlation in the ﬁrst-difference residual. z1 is the Wald test of the joint
signiﬁcance of the reported coefﬁcients. z2 is the Wald test of the joint signiﬁcance of the time dummies. z3 is the Wald test of the
joint signiﬁcance of the industry dummies.
In parentheses, t-statistics based on robust standard errors.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at p .01.
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Table  7  Related-party  transactions  and  ﬁrm  value  (2005--2012).
Model 4:
QTobinit=˛o + ˛1RPT F1it + ˛2RPT F2it + ˛3RPT F3it + ˛4DIVERGit + ˛5FAMit+˛6INSTit + ˛7BOARDit + ˛8SIZEit + ˛9LEVit + k + j + ˛i
Model 5:
CARit = ˛o + ˛1RPT F1it + ˛2RPT F2it + ˛3RPT F3it + ˛4DIVERGit + ˛5FAMit + ˛6INSTit + ˛7BOARDit + ˛8SIZEit + ˛9LEVit + k + j + ˛i
Model 6:
MKVALUEit=˛o + ˛1RPT F1it + ˛2RPT F2it + ˛3RPT F3it+˛4DIVERGit + ˛5FAMit+˛6INSTit + ˛7BOARDit + ˛8SIZEit + ˛9LEVit+k + j + ˛i
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
RPT F1it −0.08*** −0.028*** −0.091***
(−8.48) (−5.35) (−9.48)
RPT F2it −0.08*** −0.003*** −0.097***
(−11.34) (−4.80) (−11.72)
RPT F3it −0.06*** −0.041*** −0.064***
(−8.81) (−5.50) (−7.17)
DIVERGit −0.007*** −0.01*** −0.011***
(−9.13) (−6.69) (−15.39)
FAMit 0.17*** 0.29*** 0.13***
(6.70) (5.74) (5.54)
INSTit −0.14*** −0.47*** −0.060***
(−6.02) (−8.51) (−4.06)
BOARDit −0.048** −0.70*** −0.13***
(−2.17) (−12.25) (−4.06)
SIZEit −0.18*** −0.06*** −0.23***
(−12.09) (−4.44) (−14.59)
LEVit 0.17*** 0.09*** 0.17***
(9.21) (7.41) (10.46)
Constant 3.60*** −0.39 3.86***
(19.21) (−1.57) (17.67)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes
Hansen 74.98 21.19 71.77
(0.64) (0.57) (0.51)
m2 test −0.83 −1.31 −1.02
(0.408) (0.191) (0.309)
z1 test 892.21*** 555.62*** 390.42***
z2 test 17.31*** 27.34*** 7.26***
z3 test 51.14*** 92.58*** 65.20***
QTOBIN: value of the ﬁrm, measured as the relationship between capitalization and debt value and the total assets of the ﬁrm i in year
t; RPT F1 is the ﬁnancial dimension of RPTs. RPT F2 is the operating dimension of RPTs. RPT F3 is the investment dimension of RPTs.
MKVALUEit is the market value of shares scaled by total assets; CARit is the ﬁrm’s equal-weighted market-adjusted cumulative monthly
stock return for the 12-month period ending three months following the end of the ﬁscal year; FAMit is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 if the controlling shareholder of the ﬁrm is a family and 0 otherwise; INSTit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
the controlling shareholder of the ﬁrm is a ﬁnancial institution and 0 otherwise; BOARDit is the natural logarithm of the total members
on the board; SIZEit is the natural logarithm of the total assets; LEVit is total debt in year t divided by total assets.
Hansen is the test of over-identifying restrictions, under the null hypothesis that all instruments are uncorrelated with the disturbance
process. m2 is the statistic test for lack of second-order serial correlation in the ﬁrst-difference residual. z1 is the Wald test of the joint
signiﬁcance of the reported coefﬁcients. z2 is the Wald test of the joint signiﬁcance of the time dummies. z3 is the Wald test of the
joint signiﬁcance of the industry dummies.
In parentheses, t-statistics based on robust standard errors.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at p .05.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at p .01.
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iConclusions
The  knowledge  of  RPTs  in  Continental  Europe  is  limited
to  accounts  of  scandals  that  receive  media  coverage.
Additionally,  available  empirical  evidence  on  the  effectPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Bona-Sánchez,  C.,  et  al.,  Rel
BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2016,  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2016.
of  RPTs  on  ﬁrm  value  is  scarce,  inconclusive  and  focused
primarily  on  East  Asia.  In  the  current  study,  we  extend
previous  line  of  research  by  highlighting  the  prevalence  of
c
A
pPTs  in  a  Continental  European  country,  Spain,  subsequently
nalysing  the  incidence  of  these  connected  transactions
n  ﬁrm  value.  Therefore,  the  study  is  carried  out  in  a
ontext  where  the  main  concern  of  corporate  governance
s  the  potential  expropriation  of  minority  shareholders  byated-party  transactions,  dominant  owners  and  ﬁrm  value.
07.002
ontrolling  owners  (La  Porta  et  al.,  2000;  Villalonga  and
mit,  2006)  and  where  state  ownership  is  not  prevalent.  In
articular,  we  present  a  comprehensive  descriptive  analysis
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2  
f  RPTs  for  a  large  representative  sample  of  listed  Spanish
rms  over  the  period  2004--2012.  We  then  examine  the
mpact  of  RPTs  on  ﬁrm  value.
From  the  perspective  of  the  related  party  to  the  transac-
ion,  our  results  show  that  connected  transactions  between
isted  Spanish  ﬁrms  and  their  blockholders  account  for
9.84%  of  the  total  RPTs  carried  out  by  listed  Spanish  ﬁrms.
hus,  we  highlight  the  importance  of  these  connected  trans-
ctions  in  comparison  with  those  concluded  with  directors,
fﬁcers  and/or  with  an  unconsolidated  investment  of  the
rm,  which  show  far  less  relevance  in  the  Spanish  mar-
et.  Additionally,  focusing  on  connected  transactions  with
lockholders,  more  than  half  of  listed  Spanish  ﬁrms  commit
o  RPTs  over  the  analyzed  period.  Furthermore,  our  result
rovides  evidence  of  a  signiﬁcant  and  negative  relationship
etween  ﬁnancial,  operating  and  investment  dimensions  of
hese  connected  transactions  and  ﬁrm  value.  Contrary  to
revious  empirical  evidence  that  supports  opposing  effects
f  RPTs  on  ﬁrm  value  depending  on  the  nature  of  the  RPTs
e.g.,  Cheung  et  al.,  2006;  Kohlbeck  and  Mayhew,  2010),
ur  results  show  that  in  the  Spanish  setting,  independently
f  the  dimension  affected  by  the  RPTs  (ﬁnancial,  operat-
ng  or  investment),  these  connected  transactions  destroy
rm  value  because  they  promote  minority  shareholders’
xpropriation  through  tunnelling.  Therefore,  although  RPTs
onvey  a  cost  for  controlling  shareholders  in  terms  of  a
ecrease  in  shareholder  value,  our  results  are  consistent
ith  private  beneﬁts  derived  from  related  party  transactions
eing  greater  than  those  costs.
Our  research  offers  three  main  contributions  to  the
xtant  literature.  First,  our  comprehensive  descriptive  anal-
sis  of  connected  transactions  in  the  Spanish  market  shows
ovel  evidence  on  the  topic  in  Continental  Europe,  a  set-
ing  on  which  previous  studies  on  RPTs  have  not  focused  and
here,  contrary  to  previous  works  in  the  area  (Ge  et  al.,
010;  Jian  and  Wong,  2010;  Lei  and  Song,  2011;  Wong  et  al.,
015),  state  ownership  is  not  prevalent  and  economic  activ-
ty  shows  lower  levels  of  state  intervention.  Second,  and
ontrary  to  previous  studies  aimed  at  analysing  particular
ypes  of  RPTs  (Berkman  et  al.,  2009;  Friedman  et  al.,  2003;
e  et  al.,  2010;  Jiang  et  al.,  2010;  Wong  et  al.,  2015),
ur  work  is  accomplished  on  the  basis  of  analysing  all  RPTs
evealed  by  listed  Spanish  ﬁrms  in  the  Annual  Corporate  Gov-
rnance  Report  over  a  nine-year  period,  which  allows  us  to
rovide  an  exhaustive  picture  of  RPTs  in  the  Spanish  setting.
hird,  we  contribute  to  previous  literature  on  tunnelling
nd  its  potential  effects  in  the  capital  markets  by  provid-
ng  direct  evidence  of  minority  shareholders’  expropriation
hrough  the  use  of  RPTs.  Thus,  in  contrast  to  previous  studies
hat  analyze  the  relationship  between  ownership  structure
nd  ﬁrm  value  in  the  Spanish  context  (de  Miguel  et  al.,
005),  we  focus  on  the  effect  of  RPTs  on  ﬁrm  value.
Our  ﬁndings  are  important  for  investors,  auditors  and  reg-
lators  and  have  important  implications  that  may  generalize
o  other  settings  with  similar  institutional  characteristics.
n  this  sense,  while  some  progress  has  been  achieved  over
he  past  decades  in  trying  to  develop  an  effective  legal
nd  regulatory  framework  for  RPTs,  remaining  challengesPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Bona-Sánchez,  C.,  et  al.,  Re
BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2016,  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2016.
o  enforcement  and  inadequate  board  oversight  have  facili-
ated  abusive  RPTs.  Thus,  whether  the  identiﬁcation  of  RPTs
nd  the  disclosure  of  complete  information  on  RPTs  presents
 speciﬁc  challenge  in  this  setting,  effective  monitoring
B PRESS
C.  Bona-Sánchez  et  al.
nd  curbing  of  abusive  RPTs  to  avoid  controlling  share-
olders  entering  into  a transaction  to  the  detriment  of
on-controlling  owners  should  remain  a  priority  on  the
genda  of  corporate  governance  concerns  in  Spain.  Thus,
hose  involved  in  corporate  governance  should  carefully  con-
ider  the  potential  market  costs  of  entering  into  RPTs.  While
ur  ﬁndings  provide  additional  information  that  might  be
seful  in  investment  decisions,  they  also  emphasize  the
eed  to  increase  audit  efforts  in  the  presence  of  RPTs.
urthermore,  in  a  context  where  the  main  concern  of  cor-
orate  governance  is  the  potential  expropriation  of  minority
hareholders  by  controlling  owners,  we  show  evidence  that
PTs  require  a  special  regulator’s  attention  in  order  to
mprove  investor  protection  and  market  conﬁdence  to  pro-
ote  a  more  efﬁcient  allocation  of  resources.  Lei  and  Song
2011)  claim  an  important  role  for  disclosure  of  RPTs  in
educing  tunnelling  activities,  however  if  the  gains  derived
rom  opportunism  are  very  large,  as  it  might  occur  in  the
panish  context,  disclosure  policies  regarding  RPTs  may
e  insufﬁcient  to  limit  insiders  from  engaging  in  oppor-
unistic  behaviour  (Chhaochharia  and  Grinstein,  2007;  Jiang
t  al.,  2010)  because  in  the  considered  setting,  the  eco-
omic  incentives  that  gave  rise  to  this  behaviour  are  still
ntact.  According  to  McCahery  and  Vermeulen  (2005)  the
ost  important  change  lies  on  the  enforcement  side,  where
rivate  and  public  institutions  are  notably  weak  compared  to
he  US.  The  challenge  of  ﬁghting  abusive  related  party  trans-
ctions  is  as  much  about  implementation  and  enforcement
s  the  policy  framework  itself.
This  paper  suggests  several  avenues  for  future  research.
irst,  it  could  be  interesting  to  analyze  the  interactions
mong  the  governance  variables  and  the  RPT  measures  on
rm  value.  It  would  also  be  interesting  to  analyze  the  inter-
ctions  between  the  use  of  RPTs  and  the  properties  of
ccounting  earnings  --  particularly  the  use  of  RPTs  as  a  vehi-
le  for  earnings  management  in  the  Spanish  context.
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